RT

26 May 2026

he Canadian government has called for an independent investigation into Israel’s “appalling” treatment of activists aboard the Gaza-bound flotilla.

Prime Minister Mark Carney said Monday that “the protection of all civilians and respect for human dignity must be upheld everywhere, at all times,” according to a government readout of his call with Israeli President Isaac Herzog.

Canadian Foreign Minister Anita Anand said Israel’s denial of consular access to detainees violated the Vienna Convention, an international treaty requiring countries to allow detained foreign nationals to contact their diplomatic officials. Ottawa had provided West Jerusalem with evidence of abuse and expected “those responsible to be held accountable,” she wrote on X on Monday.

The diplomatic clash follows Israel’s interception of the flotilla in international waters on May 18-19 and the detention of hundreds of activists attempting to deliver aid to Gaza. National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir later released footage showing detainees kneeling with their hands restrained behind their backs while he mocked them on camera.

Activists later alleged beatings, the use of tasers, sexual assault, humiliation, stress positions, and the denial of food, water, and consular access during detention. Israel has denied the allegations.

Canada appears to be the first government to formally call for an independent investigation into the detentions, while multiple countries have condemned the interception of the flotilla and allegations of abuse against activists.

Canada’s response is particularly notable, given its longstanding support for Israel. Ottawa recognized Israel shortly after its creation in 1948, has frequently backed it diplomatically at the UN, and has developed extensive trade, security, and intelligence ties over decades. Former Prime Minister Stephen Harper famously told Israel’s parliament in 2014: “Through fire and water, Canada will stand with you.”

Israel claims the blockade of Gaza is necessary to prevent weapons from getting into the enclave. It has also denied withholding supplies from Palestinians in Gaza, almost 2 million of whom have been displaced since the outbreak of the conflict between Israel and Hamas in October 2023.

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Via https://www.rt.com/news/640584-canada-demands-israel-flotilla-abuse/

RT

Western spy agencies are intending to use Syrian militants as a proxy force against Iran, Russian Federal Security Service chief Aleksandr Bortnikov has said.

The jihadists, who fought for Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS) and other terrorist groups, are being moved from their detention facilities in Syria to special camps in Iraq, Bortnikov said during a meeting of the security chiefs from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Russia’s Irkutsk Region on Tuesday.

“The history of Islamic State began with similar Iraqi prison complexes under the protection of Western coalition intelligence agencies,” he stressed.

The CIS was established in 1991, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, to promote economic, political and security cooperation between members. It currently includes nine nations: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Moldova, and Uzbekistan.

The actions of Western spy agencies also pose a danger to the members of the organization as the released militants, “include individuals from CIS countries who fought in the Islamic State and other terrorist groups and later ended up in Syrian prisons,” Bortnikov warned. They can be used not only across the Middle East, but also in their home countries, he added.

“Undoubtedly, the escalation of the Iranian conflict and the involvement of an increasing number of parties in it is threatening to destabilize the entire Islamic world,” the FSB chief stressed.

Indirect negotiations are currently ongoing between the US and Iran amid a fragile truce, which was established in early April after a month of intense hostilities initiated by the Americans and the Israelis. Meanwhile, Tehran continues to prevent the ships of Washington’s allies from sailing through the Strait of Hormuz, which accounts for some 25% of the global crude oil trade, while the US maintains its own blockade of Iranian ports.

On Monday, Iran’s top negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi reportedly arrived in Doha for talks with Qatar’s prime minister on a potential peace deal with the US.

However, both sides downplayed hopes of a swift breakthrough, with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio saying that Washington was willing to give diplomacy a chance before deciding whether to deal with Iran in “another way.”

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said on Monday that the fact that the sides were able to reach common ground on some issue “does not mean that the signing of an agreement is imminent.”

[…]

Via https://www.rt.com/news/640587-could-iran-cut-off-internet/

Iranian Armed Forces operational command Spokesman Ebrahim Zolfaghari has recently announced that Iran intends to charge fees for the use of undersea cables passing through the Strait of Hormuz. While this news didn’t come as a surprise, it certainly heightened tensions surrounding the digital infrastructure of the Persian Gulf.

Since May 18, the Persian Gulf Strait Authority has controlled the situation in the Strait of Hormuz. This new body was established by the Supreme National Security Council of Iran and is responsible for monitoring compliance with the maritime rules set by Tehran. It was created in response to the US-initiated naval blockade that began in April.

The entire Strait of Hormuz, including its underwater infrastructure, is now viewed by Tehran as part of its jurisdiction and an area of its strategic control.

Even before the current escalation, however, discussions about undersea internet cables in the Strait of Hormuz had surfaced in Iranian media. The topic first emerged in July 2019 during a broadcast on the state-controlled IRIB television and radio network. At that time, an expert claimed that a disruption of cables in the Strait of Hormuz could potentially affect up to 70% of the world’s internet traffic.

While this figure seems exaggerated – since the global web has backup routes and much of the transit between Europe and Asia relies on other pathways like the Red Sea, Egypt, and the Mediterranean – the statement itself is quite significant.

Even if global internet service isn’t paralyzed in the event of major damage to the cables, countries in the Arabian Peninsula would face severe communication disruptions, reduced bandwidth, increased latency, and failures of digital services.

Back in 2019, the Arab nations dismissed these warnings as fanciful Persian tales. But they may have been wrong.

The expert opinion expressed in 2019 was not an official statement by the Iranian government about an intention to cut the cables. It only pointed to the potential vulnerabilities of the cables in the Strait of Hormuz and the international ramifications in case of a significant regional escalation. Thus, already at that time, Iran viewed the undersea digital infrastructure in the Strait of Hormuz as a potential tool for strategic leverage.

The question of whether Iran is indeed prepared to cut internet cables in the Strait of Hormuz should be viewed not as an isolated technical issue, but as part of Tehran’s broader strategy to exert pressure around this vital waterway.

For Iran, subsea digital infrastructure now serves as a new lever alongside oil, tanker traffic, ports, and energy logistics. However, there is a fundamental difference between pointing out vulnerabilities and physically destroying the cables.

In 2026, Iran returned to the topic of undersea internet cables, raising the issue to a new level. On April 22, Tasnim news agency, which is linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), published a report mapping the cable and cloud infrastructure of the Persian Gulf. Essentially, this served as a warning that Tehran may view the Gulf states’ digital infrastructure as part of the conflict zone. The report emphasized that the Gulf monarchies rely on maritime internet routes much more heavily than Iran itself does.

In May 2026, this idea evolved into a more developed political and economic concept. Iranian state media started pushing the narrative that Iran could charge foreign tech companies for utilizing the undersea cables that run through the Strait of Hormuz. This was not merely a question of fees; it also entailed regulatory oversight, requiring operators and major technology firms to adhere to Iranian regulations, as well as efforts to monopolize cable maintenance and repair services.

From a military perspective, Iran has the capability to threaten cable infrastructure: the Strait of Hormuz is quite shallow, maritime traffic is dense, and the cables are physically vulnerable to damage. Most damage to subsea cables occurs not from sabotage but from anchors, fishing gear, and navigational errors. Thus, there is a real possibility that these cables may become damaged. When it comes to physical interference rather than a precise cyberattack, the vulnerabilities of such infrastructure are evident.

Economically, Iran can assert its right to charge for the use of subsea cables within its maritime jurisdiction. According to international maritime law, coastal states have the authority to regulate the installation and maintenance of such infrastructure near their shores. This is why Tehran views the cables not just as  part of an international communication network but as an object under its control.

The political ramifications of such actions or the deliberate severing of cables would be substantial for Iran. Such a move would likely be perceived by the US, the Gulf nations, and major tech companies not as a ‘symmetrical response’ but as an attack on critical international infrastructure.

Moreover, executing such an operation discreetly would be exceedingly difficult for Iran, as the area is under constant military surveillance, and any blatant act of sabotage would give Tehran’s adversaries ample reason for a severe retaliatory response. For this reason, attempting to physically cut cables in the Strait of Hormuz would be an extremely risky maneuver for Iran, and would effectively escalate the conflict to a new level.

The security of these cables cannot be ensured without military force. The cable infrastructure is extensive, runs along the seabed, and is physically exposed. However, as recent months have shown, neither side is eager to place their military vessels at risk.

Repairing damaged cables presents its own set of challenges. Restoring a severed cable necessitates the deployment of specialized ships to the area and that their safe operation is ensured. In the context of military tensions, this quickly transforms from an engineering issue into a political and military one.

Without Tehran’s direct or at least tacit consent, repair efforts in the strait may prove impossible. This situation turns the threat of damage to the cables into a tool for leveraging power, since in addition to the disruption of traffic, the repair process may be complicated.

Damage to undersea cables in the Strait of Hormuz could impact not only internet speed but also the region’s connectivity with major global IT platforms. A significant portion of the digital infrastructure, including cloud services, data centers, corporate platforms, and financial systems, relies on international data transmission routes.

Disruptions in communication with Southern Europe – home to major data centers for AWS, Microsoft, and other cloud service providers – could be particularly sensitive. If data traffic from the Gulf countries needs to be urgently redirected through alternative routes, the process would put additional strain on other parts of the network. Consequently, users might experience delays, reduced speeds, unstable service quality, and interruptions in access to cloud platforms.

Predicting which specific services will suffer the most is nearly impossible in advance. Information about land-based communication lines, backup routes, and actual traffic redistribution schemes is typically not publicly available. Therefore, the repercussions will depend not only on how many cables are affected but also on how swiftly operators can reroute the traffic.

Generally, one damaged cable doesn’t trigger widespread internet collapse; traffic can be redistributed through backup routes. However, if multiple cables fail simultaneously, it would cause a drop in internet service quality. In the Gulf countries, this could impact banking operations, digital government services, cloud platforms, corporate communications, messaging apps, and logistics systems.

On a global scale, services like Telegram are unlikely to cease functioning entirely. However, in certain Gulf nations, this would cause problems: messages may be delayed, the connection could become unstable, and in the event of serious damage to several cables, access to specific services might be temporarily disrupted.

It is most likely that instead of actually damaging the cables, Iran will use the threat of such a possibility as a lever of influence. It suffices for Tehran to mention the possibility that these cables could become targets. This already alters market behavior: operators factor in added risks, repair ships proceed more cautiously in the conflict zone, Gulf countries reevaluate backup routes, and investors assess the region’s vulnerabilities not just in terms of oil but also digital infrastructure.

Meanwhile, the consequences of physical damage to the cables would differ based on the region. This wouldn’t cause a global internet blackout; there are alternative routes in place, and transit between Europe and Asia relies on various paths. However, for the Gulf states, the impact would be far more severe, affecting banking operations, cloud services, data centers, logistics, and digital government platforms. The greatest danger lies not in a single incident, but rather in a prolonged disruption and a situation in which repair ships would not be able to operate safely in the conflict zone.

Undersea cables remain primarily a means of strategic coercion for Iran – a way to demonstrate that responses to blockades or military pressure could extend beyond the oil market to digithttps://www.rt.com/news/640587-could-iran-cut-off-internet/al infrastructure as well. Physically cutting the cables would be a last resort, possible only done in the event of significant escalation – however, in the logic of its current pressure strategy, it wouldn’t be the most rational move for Iran.