Dmitry Orlov

I would very much like my readers in Europe to survive the banquet of consequences which their representatives, elected or not, have prepared for them. To this end, they should:

1. Be nowhere near the epicenter of an expected Russian tactical nuclear strike

2. Be prepared for the eventuality of a Russian tactical nuclear strike in their vicinity and be prepared to swiftly regroup and evacuate

3. Know how to survive in a post-nuclear world

In this post, I will deal with point 1 above and provide a list of these locations and a rationale for why you should be nowhere near any of them. Of course, post-nuclear survival is not for everybody. Some people would prefer to just “cover themselves with a white bedsheet and slowly crawl toward the nearest cemetery — slowly, so as not to cause a stampede in which someone might get hurt.” (This is a Russian Cold War joke.) But I do hope that my readers are survival-minded.

The first step in solving a problem is to recognize that a problem exists. This is a stretch goal for many people in Europe who still believe that they are magic elves living under an American nuclear umbrella even as their leaders put them in grave danger. In a previous post, I detailed how the currently popular Western sport of “baiting the Russian bear” is likely to produce lethal consequences:

“The object of the sport is to discover ‘Russia’s red lines,’ to ascertain with absolute certainty what sort of damage can be caused to Russia without any repercussions. The reason this sport is most unhealthy is that once you discover “Russia’s red line” you end up dead. That is not a sinister joke or an exaggeration: it is a technical fact.” [https://boosty.to/cluborlov/posts/f66846ad-28d3-4a8a-b289-84dbf42d35f7]

It is based on a general principle that Russia tends to follow: it doesn’t warn; it acts. Warning the enemy is considered counterproductive since it gives the enemy a chance to prepare. But some amount of warning is inevitable when it comes to the use of tactical nuclear weapons, since some amount of internal discussion is necessary to prepare the Russian political realm for such a drastic shift. Such a shift has been under discussion for some time, with political insiders such as Sergei Karaganov and Dmitry Medvedev playing an active role.

But then certain events tend to advance this discussion. Such an event took place just two days ago, where five consecutive waves of drone attacks against a college dormitory in Starobelsk, Lugansk Region, which resulted in 21 deaths and many injuries. Most of the victims were in training to become primary school teachers. It would be an understatement to say that Russians are incensed.

[…]

By now, most Russians understand what happened. The college was targeted using US-provided Palantir AI software with the goal of producing a maximally powerful Russian retaliation against the Kiev regime, which did happen quite promptly. The goal is to use the retaliation as yet another “proof” of “Russian aggression” and use it to justify the misallocation of yet more financial resources toward the already very much lost Ukrainian cause. Most of these resources will be misappropriated by the people doing the misallocating and the fabulously corrupt members of the Kiev regime. Distilled from all extraneous detail, the incident was a human sacrifice of primary school teachers for the sake of enriching Western and Ukrainian criminals ensconced in high offices.

All of this has produced a mounting chorus of “Why don’t we just nuke them?” (vernacularly expressed as “А может жахнем?”) within the Russian political space which even the most pro-Western and peace-minded Russian politicians are finding harder and harder to ignore. Meanwhile, on the other side of the iron curtain, the opinion prevails that mutual assured destruction remains in effect. But the technical truth of the matter is that Russia could nuke certain locations within NATO countries and Israel with almost total impunity and full legal justification of fighting terrorism. NATO has no means to intercept any of Russia’s new hypersonic rockets while Russia has ample means to intercept anything that NATO can throw at it.

[…]

“When did the sacred right to violence and murder slip from the sphere of state responsibility into the sweaty hands of ‘entrepreneurs’ in offshore jurisdictions? How should we deal with them under ‘international law’? There is an answer, of course. Because such extraterritorial actions, causing death to military personnel and civilians, are considered banal terrorism. [ibid]”

Supposing that the hunt for the terrorists has commenced, where to begin? The European leadership itself was kind enough to have provided a target list. On March 26, 2026, the leaders of several European countries decided to increase the production and supply of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Ukraine for strikes on Russian territory. The production of UAVs for the Kiev regime will be by European-based companies specializing in the production of attack drones.

“We view this decision as a deliberate step leading to a sharp escalation of the military-political situation across the entire European continent and the creeping transformation of these countries into Ukraine’s strategic rear area,” reads the Ministry of Defense statement. [https://www.kp.ru/daily/27774/5236787/]”

Here, then, is the official target list.

This is not some political fiction or a matter for further discussion. When the Ministry of Defense produces a target list, it signals their readiness to promptly destroy all items on this list when so ordered. Therefore, should you wish to survive, it would make perfect sense for you to make sure that you are nowhere near any of these locations. Here is a handy chart showing you how far you should remove yourselves from these locations:

And here are the actual locations from which you should keep a safe distance — 10km at the very list. But since life would be severely disrupted even within 50-100-km of the epicenter, if you live within that circle, you should have evacuation plans and plans for further survival, which I will detail in my next post. Meanwhile, check your distance to each of the following:

Britain:

-Fire Point is located at 2 West Row Road in Mildenhall and produces the FP-1 and FP-2 UAVs.
• Horizon Tech has offices in London (17 King Edward Street) and Leicester (5 Meridian North Block), specializing in the Sticker model.

Germany;

• Da Vinci Avia operates at 10 Felaskostrasse in Munich, manufacturing the Da Vinci UAV.
• Airlogix is ​​based in Munich (28 Lerchenauer Strasse), manufacturing the Anubis UAV.

Denmark:

• Kort is located in Stevring (Østre Alle 6) and produces the Khaki AK-1000 UAV.
• Terminal Autonomy is located in Riga (Latgales 462) and produces the AQ-400 Kosa UAV.
• Kort has an office in Vilnius (Dariaus ir Gireno 21A), also producing the Khaki AK-1000 UAV.

The Netherlands:

• Destinus is located in Hengelo (Haksbergstraat 71 and Opalstraat 60), producing the Ruta UAV.
• Antonov State Enterprise manufactures the An-196 “Luty” at 3 Wojska Polskiego Street, Mielec.
• Ukrspetssystems is located in Tarnów (30 Jana Kochanowskiego Street) and produces the RAM-2X UAV.

Spain

• Navigation UAV in Madrid (San Sebastián de los Reyes, Teide Street 3, Office 0.1) produces space radio navigation signal receivers.

Italy:

• KMD Avio in Venice (Via dell’Artigianato, 12) produces piston engines with outputs of 60–170 hp.
• MVfly in Garbagnate Milanese (Via Forlanini, 76/D) produces piston engines with outputs of 60–170 hp.
• EPA Power in Piedmont (Via Gaetano Salvemini 19) and Omegna (Via Lungolago Gramsci 7) produces piston engines with outputs of 60–170 hp.
• Gillardoni in Mandello del Lario (Viale della Costituzione 32) produces piston engines with outputs of 60–170 hp.

Czech Republic:

• PBS in Prague (Krakovská 583/9) and Velké Bíteš (Vlkovská 279) produces compact turbojet engines.
• Deviro is located in Prague (1702/65 Na Strží Street) and manufactures the Bulava UAV. 3W Professional in Hanau (33 Lise-Meitner-Strasse) produces 30 hp piston engines.

Israel:

• Elsight in Haifa (P.O. Box 539) and Or Yehuda (3 Ariel Sharon Boulevard) manufactures cellular network connectivity modules.

Turkey:

• Tualcom in Ankara (Ihsan Doğramaci Boulevard, ODTÜ, SATGEB Zone 160 and Kahramankazan District, HAB OSB Quarter, 3 G3A Sokak Street) manufactures space radio navigation signal receivers.
• Dow Aksa in Yalova (3 Akasya Street) manufactures carbon fiber for gliders

[….]

Via https://boosty.to/cluborlov/posts/3e0ff547-2cbc-448d-a064-27bf3524618b