Israeli intelligence operations inside Iran have alarmed Beijing, which saw them as a new model of intelligence warfare, prompting deeper technological, security, and strategic cooperation with Tehran.
Chinese military experts and intelligence agencies increasingly describe Mossad’s deep infiltration into Iran as opening a “Pandora’s box” of global security risks.
From Beijing’s perspective, Israeli and US intelligence operations – particularly those expanding after 2015 and accelerating through 2025–2026 – mark the evolution of a new battlespace. Mossad’s ability to embed agents, compromise sensitive databases, disable radar networks, and facilitate precision strikes from inside Iranian territory is interpreted as a shift toward what Chinese analysts call ‘Informationized and Intelligent’ Warfare.
This represents the convergence of cyber sabotage, internal recruitment, technological penetration, and operational coordination – a hybrid model in which intelligence operations hollow out defensive infrastructure before kinetic action begins.
For China, the implications extend well beyond Iran.
Intelligence warfare as a precursor
Within Chinese security discourse, Israel’s operations in Iran are frequently cited as evidence that intelligence warfare now precedes kinetic engagement.
Military expert Fu Qianshao, a former analyst in the Chinese Air Force, characterized Mossad’s success in planting agents and disabling Iranian radar and air defense systems from within as a “new pattern of intelligence warfare.” The June 2025 Israeli strikes on the Islamic Republic, which reportedly faced minimal resistance due to compromised systems, reinforced this assessment.
Fu argued that such tactics transcend traditional battlefield engagement. Instead of confronting air defenses externally, Mossad undermined them internally – neutralizing deterrence before aircraft entered contested airspace.
Another Chinese military expert, Yan Wei, echoed this concern, emphasizing that the penetration of sensitive Iranian facilities exposed structural weaknesses rather than merely technological gaps. Legal safeguards and routine security protocols, he suggested, are insufficient against intelligence operations that exploit bureaucratic vulnerabilities and internal access points.
Professor Li Li, a Chinese expert on West Asian affairs, has pointed to Israeli cyber operations targeting research centers and infrastructure as evidence of intelligence warfare functioning as a force multiplier. Unlike conventional attacks, these operations blur the line between espionage and sabotage, complicating retaliation.
Tian Wenlin, director of the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies at Renmin University, warned that sustained intelligence incursions could pressure Tehran to accelerate its nuclear capabilities as a defensive countermeasure.
Structural vulnerabilities and strategic lessons
Chinese analysts have argued that Mossad’s operations revealed structural vulnerabilities within Iranian security and administrative systems. In commentary across Chinese military and policy platforms, the breaches have been cited as evidence of weaknesses in digital infrastructure and internal safeguards.
The breaches exposed weaknesses in internal vetting, digital security, and inter-agency coordination. In Beijing, the episode was read as a warning – a reminder that intelligence warfare can exploit administrative seams as effectively as battlefield vulnerabilities.
If a state with extensive security institutions can face such penetration, similar methods could target strategic infrastructure elsewhere, including trade and energy corridors linked to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
The key takeaway in Chinese policy circles is preventative. Sovereignty in the digital era depends as much on system integrity as on military capability.
Iran’s role in Belt and Road
China’s engagement with Iran rests on long-term strategic planning.
Iran occupies a central geographic position linking East Asia to West Asia and onward to Europe. Maritime routes through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab remain essential to Chinese energy security and commercial flows.
Instability inside Iran would ripple across these corridors. For Beijing, disruptions would not be confined to regional politics; they would directly affect supply chains and infrastructure investments embedded within the BRI.
Chinese officials have therefore consistently reiterated support for Iran’s sovereignty while opposing what they describe as unilateral pressure.
Activating counterintelligence coordination
As reports of Israeli intelligence penetration intensified through 2025 and into early 2026, Beijing deepened its counterintelligence coordination with Tehran. Chinese security institutions moved from monitoring Mossad’s methods to analyzing their structural implications, treating Iran’s experience as a live operational case.
Beginning in January 2026, cooperation reportedly expanded to include joint assessments of infiltration pathways, digital vulnerabilities, and administrative access points exploited by foreign intelligence services. The breaches were understood not as isolated incidents but as indicators of systemic exposure requiring institutional response.
Through the Ninth Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of State Security, China began implementing a comprehensive strategy in January 2026 to dismantle Israeli and US spy networks in Iran. As China strengthens Iran’s digital sovereignty, Beijing is urging Tehran to abandon western software and replace it with secure, encrypted Chinese systems that are difficult to penetrate, essentially building a digital “Great Wall.”
The objective extended beyond immediate breach containment. It centered on insulating critical infrastructure that underpins Belt and Road trade corridors from sustained intelligence disruption.
China also promoted integration of its BeiDou navigation system as an alternative to western GPS platforms, reducing exposure to signal interference and enhancing guidance independence for missile and drone systems. Radar upgrades, including platforms such as the YLC-8B, reportedly strengthened detection capabilities, including against stealth aircraft.
Advanced air defense systems, including the HQ-9B, further reinforced airspace monitoring capacity. Cooperation has also extended to missile infrastructure components and technical systems supporting deterrence resilience.
Space-based surveillance capabilities, linked to Chinese satellite networks, reportedly enhanced monitoring capacity and reconnaissance support.
Embedding Iran within a broader security architecture
Beyond bilateral coordination, Beijing has sought to situate Iran within broader multilateral security mechanisms through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
The SCO’s formal security architecture centers on its Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), headquartered in Tashkent, which coordinates intelligence sharing and counterterrorism cooperation among member states. Although originally designed to address extremist threats, the framework provides institutional channels for information exchange on cross-border security risks.
Chinese policy commentary has increasingly framed the SCO as more than a counterterrorism platform. In the context of intelligence penetration and covert destabilization campaigns, Beijing has emphasized the organization’s potential as a vehicle for deeper security coordination and collective resilience against external interference.
While the SCO does not publicly maintain a mandate targeting specific intelligence services, its expanding cooperation mechanisms – particularly after Iran’s accession as a full member in 2023 – have strengthened Tehran’s integration into a broader Eurasian security network.
Embedding Iran within this framework serves both operational and political functions: it distributes counterintelligence awareness multilaterally and signals that intelligence pressure on Tehran resonates beyond bilateral relations.
Economic reinforcement and long-term commitments
Security coordination forms only one layer of Beijing’s approach. Economic integration provides another.
China remains Iran’s largest trading partner. Iranian exports to China – largely energy – have approached $22 billion annually, while imports from China stand at roughly $15 billion. The 25-year comprehensive cooperation agreement between the two countries envisions long-term Chinese investment in Iranian oil, gas, infrastructure, and industrial sectors, with projected figures often cited in the $300–$400 billion range over time.
In parallel, Beijing has employed alternative financing mechanisms designed to reduce exposure to sanctions pressure. Barter arrangements linking oil exports to infrastructure development projects, including transportation networks and industrial facilities, allow transactions to continue outside traditional financial channels.
Economic continuity reinforces strategic stability. Trade flows and infrastructure commitments create buffers that help absorb the impact of sustained political and intelligence pressure.
Diplomatic positioning and strategic restraint
China has consistently voiced diplomatic support for Iran in international forums, emphasizing principles of sovereignty, non-interference, and opposition to unilateral coercive measures. Beijing has criticized strikes on Iranian facilities and warned against escalation that could destabilize regional trade routes.
At the same time, Chinese officials avoid language that commits China to direct military defense of Tehran. The posture is deliberate. China strengthens institutional resilience, supports technological substitution, deepens economic integration, and expands diplomatic backing – while preserving distance from open confrontation with Israel or the US. Strategic caution remains central to Beijing’s calculus.
A layered response in a hybrid battlespace
Israeli intelligence operations inside Iran are widely interpreted in Chinese commentary as illustrative of how modern conflict unfolds. Intelligence warfare – combining cyber access, human networks, administrative penetration, and precision enablement – reshapes the strategic environment before conventional escalation becomes visible.
Beijing’s response reflects this assessment. Digital insulation, navigation substitution, radar modernization, satellite-supported monitoring, multilateral coordination through the SCO, and long-term economic engagement form a layered counterstrategy.
In this framework, resilience takes precedence over retaliation. The objective is to reinforce systems rather than escalate confrontation.
China’s engagement in Iran, therefore, carries dual significance. It reinforces a strategic partner facing sustained intelligence pressure while refining Beijing’s own understanding of hybrid conflict and systemic vulnerability.
The contest unfolding is structural. Sovereignty in this environment depends on hardened infrastructure, secure networks, and institutional coordination as much as on military platforms.
Containment, insulation, and calibration define Beijing’s approach – a measured effort to limit intelligence penetration while maintaining broader strategic balance.
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Via https://libya360.wordpress.com/2026/02/17/beijing-moves-to-contain-mossads-expanding-reach-in-iran/
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