Michael Snyder

If you are still able to afford a decent home, you should consider yourself to be incredibly blessed, because vast numbers of Americans do not have a permanent place to live at this point.  Homelessness in the United States is at the highest level ever recorded, and it has been growing at the fastest pace ever recorded.  The homeless encampments that have been popping up all over our major cities have been making lots of headlines in recent years, but many of the homeless live and die in very isolated places far from public view.  What I am about to share with you should deeply sadden all of us.

Way back in the woods in southwest Florida, trails that have been made out of discarded carpets lead to absolutely enormous homeless encampments where hordes of homeless people have made homes for themselves.

One man was able to find these infamous “carpet trails”, and he posted footage of them on his YouTube channel…

By Luke Andrews Senior Health Reporter For Dailymail.Com

A military family who lost custody of their autistic son after they refused to transition his gender are suing a major DC hospital.

The family said their boy had never shown any desire to become a girl until, at 16, he was hospitalized for self-harming after a bitter breakup with his girlfriend in 2021.

Staff at Children’s National Hospital informed the family that he wanted to be female and should be referred to using she/her pronouns going forward, the suit claims.

His army veteran parents, from Prince George County in Maryland, rejected the suggestion, saying their son was ‘impressionable’ due to being autistic.

They have accused the hospital of starting a ‘full-on campaign to transgender this child’ and accused staff of ‘mental re-programming’, saying their son had been forced to write letters to friends disavowing his previous male identity.

According to the lawsuit, the hospital used its emergency policies to keep the boy in its units and reported the parents to child protection services.

The boy was then moved into foster care and hasn’t been back to the family home since. What followed has been a two-year legal battle for custody over the teen, who is now 19 and remains in foster care.

The parents, who are in their 40s and African-American, say their son was at risk because his condition means he is vulnerable to social manipulation.

[…]

Via https://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-13668663/Maryland-family-lost-custody-16-year-old-autistic-son.html

By Ben Bartlee

As far as I am concerned, there are two options here, each of which is equally plausible:

• The Karamel-uh entity overheard the true impetus of the Climate Change™ hoax at some point and didn’t realize or forgot that she’s not supposed to say the quiet part out loud
• The social engineers are simply getting more brazen in their declaration of intentions, and so these comments were intentionally inserted into the Karamel-uh entity’s speech — later to dismiss it as a “gaffe” — to move the Overton window in the direction of global genocide

Either way, these words escaping the lips of a possible future president (and maybe sooner that we realize if the MIA Brandon entity never resurfaces and is declared dead from COVID or domestic terrorism or whatever) should be front page news everywhere.

What explanation I don’t buy is the framing by the White House, relayed via the New York Post uncritically, that this was a “gaffe.”

Via New York Post (emphasis added)

“Vice President Kamala Harris on Friday called on the US to ‘reduce population’ in an effort to combat climate change, but she meant to say ‘reduce pollution,’ according to the White House.

The shocking gaffe happened as the 58-year-old vice president delivered remarks at Coppin State University in Baltimore, Md., on the need to build a ‘clean energy economy.’

‘When we invest in clean energy and electric vehicles and reduce population, more of our children can breathe clean air and drink clean water,’ Harris said, eliciting applause from the audience.

The official White House transcript of her speech acknowledges and corrects Harris’ disquieting error.*

In the transcript, ‘population’ is crossed out and ‘pollution’ is added in brackets to denote what the VP intended to say.”

*This is gaslighting nonsense; shame on the New York Post for printing it. Transcripts are supposed to reflect what was actually said, not edited later on to say whatever the governing authorities would like them to say.

She declares depopulation as the agenda clear as day in the video below:

[…]

Via https://www.globalresearch.ca/kamala-promotes-depopulation-climate-change/5863560

With Biden Out, We Effectively Have No President Right Now

3:58 PM · Jul 23, 2024

What happens next? I’m not sure anyone really knows. We have stepped out of narrative and into history, and things are moving fast now. But what must not happen is that we the people simply trundle along and accept the narrative that we’re given by the coup plotters and the media. There has to be accountability for them as much as for the Secret Service and other deep-state actors who set the stage for an assassination attempt on Trump.
…
And we have to be clear-eyed about the fact that we have sailed into very dangerous waters. Whether we make it out is by no means certain.

The point here is that the people now running the show—without even the fig leaf of constraints as far as anyone can tell—do not answer to the American people. Not even in a make believe kinda way. They answer to special interests. None of these people ran for election, and they don’t get on national TV to address the nation.

Of course the main task for the Deep State now is to gaslight We the People regarding the attempted assassination of Trump. But don’t expect the rest of the world to wait on that. The rest of the world has its own agenda, and the people who rule America have an agenda too. Events could move quickly.

[…]

Via https://meaninginhistory.substack.com/p/the-new-american-experiment-no-potus

Available at LULU

[…]

Via https://politicalfilm.wordpress.com/2024/07/25/amazon-bezos-censors-kamala-book/

Bluetruth: Scientific Proof the Vaxxed Emit a Bluetooth MAC Signal

COMUSAV (2023)

Spanish with English substitles

Film Review

A Substack reader referred me to this fascinating documentary describing the work of  of COMUSAV (Coalición Mundial Salud y Vida/World Health and Life Coalition) in investigating the presence of Bluetooth transmitting graphene nanoparticles in recipients of ALL Covid vaccines, including the Russian and Chinese versions.

In 2021, Spanish scientist Dr Pablo Campro was first to detect graphene nanoparticles in vials of Pfizer mRNA vaccine via micro-Raman spectroscopy. Similar graphene nanoparticles have since been detected by other scientists, in other vaccines and in the blood of vaccine recipients.

The film describes in vivo experiments by Mexican physician and COMUSAV member Dr Pedro Chavez Zavala in both vaccinated and unvaccinated patients and from cemetery plots of Mexicans who died in 2021 and 2022. As he describes in the video, graphene oxide is metabolized to graphene hydroxide when injected into human beings, which enables it to transmit electromagnetic frequencies.

In the specific experiment described, most of the vaccinated patients Dr Zavala tested transmitted a MAC (Medica Access Control Address) used in Bluetooth networks and the Internet of Things.

In the image above, the OUI (the first six digits) normally represent a unique manufacturer identifier (eg Apple, Google, etc).

In Dr Zavala’s experiments, none the OUI’s he detected corresponded with known manufacturers.

There were also a small number of vaccinated subjects who failed to transmit MACs after completing the COMUSAV spike protein/graphene oxide detox protocol.

Most of the unvaccinated subjects he scanned produced no MAC. The few who did either had vaccinated sexual partners or had undergone PCR or RAT testing.

Even more fascinating is the screening Dr Zavala and his team did in a remote Mexican cemetery. Where burial plot emitted MACs, in each case the deceased had been buried in 2021 or 2022 and presumably received a Covid jab.

At the end of the film, the camera scans through an extensive bibliography of studies confirming the presence of graphene oxide in Covid vaccines. The most interesting paper cited is by military intelligence specialist Dr Kira Smith military intelligence specialist Dr Kira Smith. It explains the historical use of graphene oxide nanotubes in the brain for various medical monitoring

The COMUSAV protocol is available (in English) at https://comusav.com/usa/

Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong

In the late 20^th Century, there was a “tendency of [Anglosphere] media to focus almost exclusively on the negative side of the African experience,” with Africa “seen as the one part of the world for which the future was likely to be far worse than the past.”^[1] A UK business journal famously labelled Africa “The Hopeless Continent.”^[2]

A quarter century later Western media still frame Africa negatively.^[3] Dominant depictions are built on a patronizing racism that has its roots in the colonial and neo-colonial relationship between the West and Africa. Chinese activities on the continent are similarly judged by Western entities to be uniquely negative,^[4] influencing some African media to do the same.^[5] The consistent Western deprecation of the Chinese presence in the continent reflects both Yellow Peril and Red Menace ideologies mobilized to confront what the US government regards as its “only peer competitor.”

Western media promote, for example, a “Chinese debt trap” claim; yet, studies have shown that China holds only an 18% share of Africa’s external debt^[6] and that among 19 African countries in debt distress in 2017,  the share of these countries’ external debt to China averaged just 15%.^[7]

Moreover, after the G-20 created the Debt Service Standstill Initiative in 2020 to supposedly relieve heavily indebted states, China became the most significant debt relief country in this initiative. It suspended $5.7 billion in debt payments, contributing to more than half of the total global debt moratorium. Through this action, 45% of debts owed by the poorest countries to China was suspended. In contrast, the UK had no suspension of payments on its commercial loans and still recovered $3.2b in debt from countries that applied for the debt standstill initiative.^[8]

China renegotiated or wrote off more than $78b in loans for foreign infrastructure projects between 2020 and early 2023.^[9] After obtaining China’s debt relief in 2023, Ethiopia requested other G-20 countries to also suspend the country’s debt payments.^[10]

Compared to Western media coverage, “Chinese reporting on the continent is more abundant, positive and diverse.”^[11] Western media focus mainly on corruption and ineffectiveness of African leaders, civil wars and terrorism. Chinese media report on a wide range of socio-economic topics and are positive about Africa’s development potential and its wider global and regional connections beyond the West.

Chinese officials and scholars affirm that “China needs Africa as much as Africa needs China”^[12] or even that “China needs Africa more than Africa needs China.’”^[13] China calls Africa “a continent of opportunities and a promising land for investors.”^[14] China and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) benefit from solid African diplomatic support, but China also reciprocates; thus, in 2022 it launched an “Initiative for Peaceful Development in the Horn of Africa” and in 2023 upgraded its relationship with Ethiopia from a “strategic partnership” to the rare level of “all-weather development cooperation.”^[15]

No Chinese leader has pronounced, as did French President Nicolas Sarkozy in Senegal in 2007, that Africans have “not entered history” and are not oriented toward the future or progress.^[16] Even as Trump in 2018 termed African states “shithole countries,”^[17] Xi Jinping framed African states and peoples as equals, distinct from the hegemonic dehumanization in western media.”^[18]

From 2014-2020, he made ten trips to Africa, while in 2017-2022, there was only a single, brief stopover in Africa by a US president, in Egypt.^[19] Although one can find examples of internalization of western stereotyping, in large part Chinese merchants who live on the African continent are  equally positive in their perceptions of African development and potentials for economic partnership.  Chinese who work closely with Africans^[20] and Chinese managers at industrial enterprises in Ethiopia we interviewed, regard local workers as reliable, adaptable, quick-learners.^[21]

Ethiopia as a BRI Model: Industrialization through infrastructure building

Among Africa’s 54 states, 52 are part of the BRI, but there is no African country that Chinese officials have been more positive about than Ethiopia; they regard it, as an idiom puts it, “the only one and no number two” (独一无二).   Ethiopia is Africa’s second most populous country.  It has a Japan-level population, but is growing at 2.5% per annum and with an average age of 18.8, while Japan’s population is shrinking at -0.5% per year and has an average age of 49.^[22] Despite an ongoing civil war in 2022, Ethiopia’s GDP grew by 5.3%, versus 3.6% for all of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).^[23]

Though GDP growth does not capture the entirety of human development and wellbeing, at the junction of world and especially developing country economic stagnation, this level of GDP growth is welcomed. Addis Ababa is the “capital of Africa,” hosting the African Union, UN Economic Commission on Africa, and African Center for Disease Control, plus Africa offices of many international organizations, such as the United Nation Development Program.

Ethiopia is however seen as the BRI model country in Africa for reasons more directly related to key aspects of the Initiative – infrastructure building and industrializing investment. As a Kenyan analyst has put it, “China is the only major country that has proven quite interested in going into fragile situations to do some infrastructure projects in Africa,”^[24] while Western states have scaled back such activities.^[25] By 2017, Chinese firms had 50% of Africa’s internationally-contracted construction market.^[26] China also provides financial wherewithal for infrastructure-building, with more than one-fifth the value of external loans to sub-Saharan Africa coming from Beijing.^[27] In 2006-2018, China lent Ethiopia US$14.83 billion, 82.2% of it for 70 mega-projects (22 in transport and communications, 35 in power, 13 for sugar factories and urban water supply).^[28]

An Ethiopian business journal stated in 2020 that “Ethiopia is the leading country in sub-Saharan Africa with the highest number of Chinese contracted projects.” It averred that “Almost all big buildings, roads and dam projects throughout the country are being handled by Chinese contractors.” Local firms are not thought to be equipped to complete mega-projects, but Ethiopians do participate.

[…]

In fact, contrary to Western media portrayals, not many Chinese work at projects in Ethiopia. There were fewer than 6,000 in 2021, among the 15,000 Chinese then-reported as living in a country of 127 million people.^[30]

Ethiopia as a BRI Model: Industrialization through manufacturing

China is important to Africa’s trade pattern. Using the problematic category of “Sub-Saharan Africa” (SSA), one-fifth of its total goods exports go to China, with metals, minerals, and fuel some three-fifths of that, although Ethiopia exports none of these. China is also the largest source of imports in Africa, mainly manufactures and machinery.^[31] Many imports are used in Chinese infrastructure and industrial projects, especially in Ethiopia.

China’s proportion of the stock of SSA’s FDI is still small, at 4.4%. ^[32] Its share however is growing, while the UK and US shares have diminished: they had 17% and 15% of FDI stock in Africa in 2004–08, but only 6% percent each in 2014–18.  From 2016 to 2020, China also contributed 20% of the value of greenfield (entirely new) FDI in Africa, more than three and four times the US and UK shares.^[33] Moreover, little of the US’s aid to Africa promotes industrialization.^[34]

Despite scholars contending that “Several features of Ethiopia make it a ‘perfect storm’ for Chinese investment,”^[35] the country has been central to China’s industrializing investment in Africa.  African leaders emphasized at the 2022 AU meeting that industrialization is key to mitigating poverty and must be sped up.^[36] When the BRICS countries met in 2023, Ethiopia was asked to join and Xi Jinping said China would “support Africa in growing its manufacturing sector and realizing industrialization and economic diversification.”^[37]

Already by 2017, China was said to be involved in 12% of Africa’s industrial production.^[38] Some 13.4% of its stock of investment in Africa in 2021 was in manufacturing – with 37% in construction and 10% in mining^[39]-but manufacturing’s importance is increasing, especially in Ethiopia.  In 18 key African states in 2000-2010 and 2010-2018, manufacturing’s average annual value-added growth was 5% and 4.3%; while in Ethiopia it was 7.8% and 16.8%.  Average annual growth in manufacturing jobs in the 18 states was 4.8% and 4.9%; in Ethiopia it was 11.2% and 6.9%.^[40]

Some 3,000 Chinese firms operate in Africa; 70% of them private.^[41] The proportion is similar in Ethiopia^[42].  While state-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate in construction, Chinese firms in manufacturing are mainly private. SOEs are large and experienced, but private firms vary in size, background and focus: many are small-to-medium and family-owned and thus more vulnerable to such destabilizing factors as epidemics, civil wars, and sanctions.^[43]

Ethiopia is Africa’s second largest FDI recipient and China plays a key role in its industrialization.^[44] As of late 2023, China’s 1,844 investment projects in Ethiopia were 4-5 times the number of US and Indian projects.^[45] Its stock of investment in 2023, at $4.8b, was one-tenth the stock of all Chinese FDI in Africa and one-sixth the stock of all FDI in Ethiopia. It is said to have created 560,000 Ethiopian “job opportunities,” mainly in clothing and textiles, building materials, plastics and metals, and engineering.  In 2021, Chinese firms accounted for 60% of Ethiopia’s approved new FDFI projects, almost all in manufacturing and services.^[46]

Ethiopia’s manufactured exports in 2023 were a fifth of all its exports. Chinese manufacturing exporters are based in Ethiopia’s 13 public and 5 private industrial parks (IPs), eleven of them Chinese-built and mostly housing Chinese firms.  IPs have attracted FDI of US$740m since 2013 and IP occupancy rates have been as high as 80%.  They have created 150,000 jobs, almost all for locals and mainly for women.  The oldest IP, the Chinese-managed Eastern Industrial Park near Addis, had 26,000 workers in 2023, 5% of them Chinese and 70-80% women.^[47] Hawassa IP, 275 km south of Addis was even larger and 97% of its 35,000 workers in 2021 were locals.^[48] Ethiopia plans to transform all IPs into special economic zones. The first will be the Chinese-built Dire Dawa IP being completed in late 2023, 450 km from the capital, along with the Chinese-built railway from Addis to the port at Djibouti that handles Ethiopia’s external trade.^[49]

Ethiopia as a BRI Model: non-economic aspects 

The Ethiopia/China BRI relationship is not wholly economic; for example, educational ties are well-developed.  In 2018, China had recruited 81,500 African university students and offered more scholarships to its African students than all the leading Western governments combined.^[50] Already by 2017, when China had 74,011 African students, 4,883 were Ethiopians, up from 844 in 2011 and more than twice the number of Ethiopians studying in the US.^[51] In 2023, Ethiopians were said to “account for the largest Chinese scholarship recipients.”^[52] China was also supporting 117 Ethiopians studying at Addis Ababa University.^[53]

The Luban Workshop, a vocational training program China developed as part of the BRI, is worth noting as well.  It has operated since 2016 in 25 developing countries, including Ethiopia.  Workshops are partly tailored to graduates getting jobs in local Chinese firms and one at Ethiopian Technical University since 2021 is paired with China’s Tianjin University of Technology.  Many of its instructors are Ethiopians who studied in China.  The curriculum centers on robotics and AI-using manufacturing, as well as including  learning specific to IT giant Huawei’s technology. This is perhaps one reason why an Ethiopian team finished 3^rd among 146 teams from 36 countries in Huawei’s 2023 ICT competition.^[54]

[…]

Ethiopia as a BRI Model, But Not a Model for Transformation

Although Ethiopia is a model BRI country in Africa, the relationship is not unproblematic.  On the Chinese side, in mid-2023, infrastructure-builders faced severe problems from the Ethiopian government’s shortage of foreign exchange and from increasing materials costs.^[56] The situation for IPs since early 2022 has also been precarious, due to US sanctions imposed during the civil war with Tigrayan rebels.^[57] Ethiopia’s eligibility for duty-free entry of its goods into the US under the politically-conditioned African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was suspended which, the Ethiopian government said, resulted in “millions” of workers being laid off.^[58] The US move caused Ethiopia to further strengthen its ties with China and though the war ended in November 2022, the US renewed its sanctions against Ethiopian officials in fall 2023.  Ethiopia remains outside AGOA, which itself may expire for all of Africa in 2025.^[59] China, in contrast, now grants zero tariff treatment to 98% of products from Ethiopia.^[60]

On the Ethiopian side, Chinese and other foreign-invested firms continue to pay IP workers very low wages, averaging with benefits only about US$100 a month.  That is less pay than for comparable work in Bangladesh, albeit slightly higher than what workers earn at surrounding Ethiopian-owned firms.  Wages of the few Chinese IP employees, mainly managers, supervisors, and trainers, are much higher, up to 20 times the local wage.^[61] Unsurprisingly then, there have been strikes, such as one at the Hawassa IP in 2019.^[62] These actions had achieved some positive outcomes, such as higher wages and recognition of unions – until many thousands of workers at Hawassa and other IPs were laid off in 2022 due to sanctions.l violence.^[63]

[…]

Via https://libya360.wordpress.com/2024/07/24/ethiopia-as-a-belt-and-road-initiative-model/

Yemen’s unprecedented drone strike on Israel’s economic powerhouse has further shattered the occupation state’s perceived invulnerability. Moreover, it announced the launch of Ansarallah’s fifth phase of war: ‘Target Tel Aviv.’

The Cradle’s Military Correspondent

On 19 July, a low-altitude drone breached Tel Aviv’s airspace from the sea and detonated, causing one fatality and injuring ten others.

The incident sent shockwaves through the occupation state, with a panicked populace and bewildered policymakers grappling with the Israeli army’s “mega-failure” to intercept a single drone amid prolonged aggression against Gaza and the mounting tensions with Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The attack’s impact was magnified by its direct hit on Tel Aviv, the heart of Israel’s governmental and economic power, starkly exposing inadequacies in its defense strategies and further alarming a population that has for months been questioning the effectiveness of its military preparedness.

It wasn’t long before the de facto Yemeni authorities in Sanaa claimed responsibility  for the attack, calling the strike a retaliation for Israeli massacres and threatening more to come.

But how did a Yemeni drone reach the heart of Israel’s most fortified region and strike a blow to Israeli military pride?

Tactical evolution of suicide drones

Suicide drones, as they are known, are a relatively modern weapon, posing significant challenges even for technologically advanced states like the US and Israel. These drones vary in range, warhead size, speed, and guidance methods.

Analysis of the wreckage revealed that the “Yaffa” drone, an enhanced version of Yemen’s Sammad drones, was employed in the operation. The name is deeply symbolic as it references the ancient port city of Jaffa, also known as Yaffa in Arabic, which now forms part of modern-day Tel Aviv.
Yaffa Drone

Its rectangular wing shape and V-shaped tail distinguish it, but it is notably the more powerful 275 cc (16 kW) engine that sets it apart. This engine enables the drone to cover distances exceeding 2000 kilometers – sufficient to reach Tel Aviv from Yemen.

Unlike with ballistic missiles, the difficulty in tracking drones lies in their ability to take unconventional paths, maneuver through winding routes, and hide behind terrain features, making them hard to detect by radar systems.

This detection challenge is a daily issue in northern occupied Palestine, where drones operated by Lebanese resistance groups often go unseen by the increasingly blinded occupation army.

Moreover, drones are typically constructed from lightweight materials such as fiberglass, carbon fiber, or various reinforced plastics that do not reflect radar waves effectively, which is crucial for detection and tracking.

Their low speeds reduce the need for the metallic compositions necessary in constructing conventional military hardware like missiles and fighter jets. Consequently, drones can be mistaken for birds by radar systems. This confusion has occurred regularly in northern occupied Palestine since the war’s onset, with Israel’s Iron Dome defense system spotted expending its limited supply of $50,000 projectiles shooting at birds during this conflict.

Yaffa’s route to Tel Aviv

The suicide drone likely took an unconventional path to evade detection. Previous Yemeni attempts have been intercepted in Egyptian Sinai airspace, with Israeli-allied Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt contributing to these detection and interception efforts.

On the night of the attack, however, no US aircraft carrier groups were in the Red Sea, and the nearest carrier, the USS Theodore Roosevelt, was positioned in the Indian Ocean. Israel’s air force has suggested that the drone may have taken a non-traditional route via Eritrea, Sudan, and Egypt, crossing near the Suez Canal before entering the Mediterranean and turning east toward Tel Aviv.
Possible path of Yaffa drone that targeted a building in Tel Aviv

Some aspects of that route seem unlikely: the Suez Canal area is heavily patrolled by Egyptian air defense, with its 8th Brigade stationed there, so the Israeli announcement may have been an attempt to pressure Egypt.

Israel’s response: Bombing Hodeidah

On 20 July, Israeli aircraft launched punishing airstrikes on the besieged Yemeni port of Hodeidah, specifically targeting areas designated for fuel and oil storage, as well as destroying port cranes used for loading and unloading cargo and a power station.

But these were civilian targets in a country already suffering from the effects of the Saudi-led coalition blockade, which has caused severe shortages of fuel and essential resources needed for power generation and transportation.

The strike at these particular target banks, which killed at least six and wounded dozens of others, appears to be primarily aimed at creating significant explosions and large fires to help Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu score points at home.

But the Israeli response against civilian targets also reveals that Tel Aviv suffers from a dearth of intelligence on potential Yemeni military targets. It was also evident that the selected targets were ones that Saudi Arabia and the US have refrained from striking due to fears of Yemeni retaliation, which could strike Saudi commercial ports or oil exports in one of the world’s most vital energy passages.

Indeed, Riyadh was quick to deny any involvement in the assault, fearing reprisals from Sanaa, although  reports  that Israeli jets used Saudi airspace for this attack suggest otherwise.

Video footage shows that Israel used F-35 and F-15 fighter jets, as well as Boeing 707 tanker aircraft, due to the distance involved – a range exceeding 4,000 kilometers round trip. Israeli-released footage suggests that the strikes were carried out using Spice guided missiles launched from outside the Yemeni air defense range.

Some of these missiles are equipped with boosters that extend their range up to 150 kilometers, which only showcased Israeli operational limitations against Yemen in a broader conflict, in which Sanaa’s air defenses will be surely activated against enemy aircraft, drones, and projectiles.

Yemen’s retaliation

Yemeni officials, led by Ansarallah leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi and Yemeni Armed Forces Spokesman Brigadier General Yahya Saree, quickly announced a decision to launch retaliatory strikes against Israel, in which they declared Tel Aviv to be an “unsafe zone” and warned of Yemen’s readiness for a “long war” against the occupation state.

Given the targeting of vital civilian infrastructure, this places several Israeli targets on the list of potential Yemeni target banks. These include fuel tanks in Haifa, clearly shown in video footage taken by a Hezbollah drone weeks ago, as well as fuel tanks in Ashkelon and the power stations adjacent to these tanks.

What concerns Israelis the most, however, is Yemen’s potential targeting of vital gas platforms in the Mediterranean Sea, stationary targets highly susceptible to significant ignition and explosion. While there are currently only three active Israeli gas fields – Karish, Tamar, and Leviathan – in operation, these fields have become essential to Israel’s energy independence.

Underestimating Sanaa’s resolve

The damaging Israeli strike on Hodeidah Port was based on an assumption by Tel Aviv that it would deter a Yemeni counterstrike. But Yemen’s Ansarallah Movement, which has endured years of punishing Saudi, Emirati – and now US and UK – military attacks, has shown no inclination whatsoever to halt its operations in support of Gaza.

While the Israelis may have felt an obligation for a quick military fix by striking Hodeidah – the port, incidentally, has already reopened for business – it comes at the expense of any logical assessments of losses and gains. Already facing strategic defeat in Gaza and unable to follow through with its threats against Lebanon, Tel Aviv has cracked open a new front with Yemen, the most fearless component of West Asia’s Axis of Resistance.

The Israelis are between a rock and a hard place, desperately trying to cleave to old narratives of regional military superiority to keep domestic faith in the Zionist project, yet unable to score victories anywhere.

Based on Yemen’s oft-declared resolve not to retreat from any escalation, it is expected that the outcome of the Hodeidah strike will lead to a compounded retaliatory operation against the occupation state. Israel, however, has limited operational freedom due to issues related to geographic distance – such as the airspace and uninterrupted refueling access required – which makes waging war against Yemen a nonstarter.

Harsher strikes on critical Israeli centers are likely to drive Israel into greater missteps and strategic errors, especially at a time when escalation and the further weakening of its deterrence are counterproductive to its interests.

By targeting the Yemenis directly, Israel has underestimated the resolve and capabilities of a  formidable adversary, potentially choosing the worst possible opponents in this round of conflict.

[…]

Via https://libya360.wordpress.com/2024/07/24/the-stunning-audacity-of-yemens-drone-strike-on-tel-aviv/