Dmitry Orlov

June 14, 2026

Are you tired of geopolitics? I know I am! More and more, it seems like a ploy for keeping pundits and analysts and internet talking heads talking and to keep you looking at online advertising. And so, for a change, I’d like to write about something else. But first, let me briefly describe the geopolitical landscape I wish to leave behind.

First, we have the United States. It is figureheaded by a man who is dawdling toward senescence but still manages to draw a lot of attention to himself. He keeps everyone in thrall by saying one thing in the morning and another in the evening. There is no rational explanation for his behavior except that it is driven by a desire to further enrich himself and his family through insider trading, as follows, explained in the simplest terms possible, using a bit of pseudocode.

Step 1. Trump clan sells stocks, buys oil futures. Trump announces: “I will destroy Iran!” Stocks tank, oil rallies.

Step 2. Trump clan buys stocks, sells oil futures. Trump announces: “I make deal with Iran!” Stocks rally, oil tanks.

Step 3. Go to step 1.

It is something that’s known as an “infinite loop” but in real life nothing lasts forever and at some point the oil futures and equities traders start discounting his pronouncements. The more intelligent ones probably already have but the robots which do most of the trading these days still haven’t and they are yet to be reprogrammed to ignore Trump. Once they are, Trump’s scheme will stop working. It remains to be seen whether or not he is capable of noticing such a fact. But it is notable that everyone else seems to be ignoring Trump’s geopolitically themed insider trading. The reason for this is that money is more important than self-preservation.

Ignoring its self-serving figurehead, we are waiting for the United States to make a very important financial decision: will it choose endless horror (runaway debt, hyperinflation, social explosion and political collapse) or a horrible end (national default and bankruptcy, economic shutdown, social explosion and political collapse). A little of both is also not out of the question. The new Federal Reserve chairman is quite forthright about the choices: they are all bad.

Moving on to Europe, there is nobody in charge in Europe who is even remotely capable of speaking intelligently on the topic of geopolitics. The main political tactic for the last decade or so has been to mask economic and social decline using Russophobia: Russia bad; hence all the problems. But they seem to have gotten carried away with threatening Russia to a point where Russia is not even threatening them but grinding a very big axe with which to chop them into tiny, insignificant bits. Some of the Europeans have noticed and are trying to pick someone who is capable of walking in and speaking to the Russians. It can’t be someone whom the Europeans regard as pro-Russian and it can’t be a Russophobe with whom the Russians will refuse to talk. These two sets appear to be to be disjoint (A∩B=∅).

Hence, Europe is at an impasse diplomatically. Meanwhile, the Europeans can’t stop themselves from giving drones and rockets to the Ukrainian. This further irritates Russia and causes it to accelerate the axe-sharpening. That is because there is money in drones and rockets and money is more important than self-preservation.

This is something of a refrain. Such behavior is certainly foolish, and this bring to mind an old saying: “A fool and his money are soon parted.”

Outside of the United States and Europe lies a geopolitical terra incognita — the vast domain of other civilizations (Persian, Chinese, Russian, Indian, etc.). They are older than the West and different from it and therefore far too complex for a short online article or an hour-long online interview, remaining inscrutable. Any attempt to comprehend these other civilizations from the Western point of view turns, at best, into a futile quest to weigh objects using a ruler or to bail water with a sieve or, at worst, into an exercise of projecting the shadow (“…a Jungian psychological defense mechanism where an individual unconsciously attributes his own disowned thoughts, impulses, or unacceptable character traits to someone else.”) Someone should write a succession of weighty tomes on this subject. But then, would anyone bother to read them when everybody is too busy watching online videos?

[…]

Via https://boosty.to/cluborlov/posts/7e5414dc-f03d-4e95-a956-e4beeea719aa

Filipe Rafaeli June 11, 2026

What Was Covid-19?

I’ll give you a simple summary. And I know this summary will make a lot of people stop reading right here. If that’s you, I’ll say it upfront: I can explain why you feel that way.

The pandemic in a nutshell: Covid-19 always had very effective and inexpensive treatments, right from the start. Millions were left to die because it was, of all things, profitable.

The lockdowns, when the world stopped as it never had before in history, was never necessary beyond two weeks, because with the disease properly treated, fewer people would have died than in a common flu season.

Yes, that’s exactly what I said: millions dead for profit. For money. Does that shock you?

I know it’s a hard story to believe. I understand. Because to believe it, given that it involves an enormous number of people, institutions, medical societies, scientific bodies, regulatory agencies, all in sync to cover up and steer people away from valid treatments, you have to believe something else: that humanity, at its core, doesn’t care. It’s a blow to your faith in human goodness. That’s not easy to let go of.

Let’s Get Straight to the Biggest Contrast of Covid-19

Six years after the pandemic, some striking contrasts remain. Let’s look at the most remarkable one: the hydroxychloroquine saga.

[…]

In the US, newspapers treated the subject as a “conspiracy theory.” In Brazil, a physician named Luana Araújo appeared before Congress during a parliamentary investigation and stated that “Discussing chloroquine is choosing which edge of the flat Earth we’re going to jump off.”

[…]

And yet, despite all the clarification across every major newspaper that HCQ was “conclusively proven ineffective” against Covid, as the mainstream media put it, some physicians, clearly delusional, kept insisting that there was, in fact, evidence. Many of them were fired, faced investigations, and even lost their medical licenses. After all, only someone as deluded as a flat-earther could promote such dangerous nonsense and put society at risk.

Now let’s get to the contrast. Open a link with me. It’s a news article. Let’s open it, check the website address, verify the source carefully: “Hydroxychloroquine provides moderate COVID-19 prevention, large clinical trial shows.”

No, this is not some obscure corner of the internet. It’s right there, on the University of Oxford’s website: chloroquine is effective against Covid-19. Worth remembering that Oxford consistently ranks among the three most prestigious universities in the world by any measure, competing directly with MIT, Harvard, and Stanford. With nearly a millennium of history, the University of Oxford was a cornerstone of the Enlightenment, playing a crucial role in humanity’s transition from the darkness of the Middle Ages into the age of reason and the scientific method.

Quite a contrast, isn’t it?

Things Worth Noticing About the Oxford Study

Oxford only delivered its verdict because this was a meta-analysis of randomized trials – the highest possible level of evidence a medication can reach. For reference: according to a study published in JAMA in 2019, only 8.5% of recommendations in the major American cardiology guidelines meet that standard (multiple randomized controlled trials). To flip the numbers: 91.5% of the guidelines cardiologists follow are based on weaker evidence than what Oxford presented for HCQ.

HCQ against Covid-19, then, belongs to a select group of the most thoroughly proven treatments in existence. That’s exactly why Oxford didn’t use the cautious language typical of scientific studies – none of the usual “may be effective,” followed by “further studies are needed.” They brought the hammer down: it works. Full stop.

[…]

And there’s more: the news article includes a photo of the research team. Over 70 people signed the study, not much room for argument, outrage, or grandstanding. Because outrage and personal wishes count for nothing in science. Among the signatories is Sir Nicholas John White, a scientist with an H-index above 200, the world’s foremost expert on tropical diseases. Is there anyone left foolish enough to call Oxford a “flat-earther?”

Necessary Questions About Oxford

I’d like to now move on to chlorine dioxide and say more about (Pierre) Kory’s book, but I can’t yet. I need to go a little deeper into the HCQ story first. Either way, it’s important for you to understand a bit more about how this field works. Think of it as the warmup before the main event.

The first question: why did Oxford take more than 800 days to publish the study’s results? Can you think of any reason why findings would sit in a drawer for more than two years?

Oxford conducted its gold-standard clinical trial on pre-exposure prophylaxis (that is, taking the medication before any contact with the virus, with the goal of preventing infection). In Oxford’s trial, the use of chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine showed a 57% reduction in PCR-confirmed Covid-19 cases. Then, within the same study, they conducted a meta-analysis, pooling their trial with similar pre-exposure prophylaxis studies. Every previous study also showed positive results.

The second question: why did they change the outcome measure to seroconversion midway through the study? Vaccine trials didn’t use that metric. They all used PCR testing. Seroconversion only measures whether the body produced antibodies, not whether the person actually got sick. Could changing the outcome be what made the result, as the headline put it, merely “moderate?”

A note to close this topic: this Oxford meta-analysis covers pre-exposure prophylaxis, taking hydroxychloroquine before infection to prevent it. For that use, it reached the highest possible level of evidence. But HCQ is also highly effective for early treatment, taking it in the first days after infection to prevent the disease from worsening. The evidence there is solid, though not at the same peak level. It’s also effective for post-exposure prophylaxis, taking it after contact with an infected person to prevent catching the disease. Again, good evidence, but not at the maximum tier. (Side note: it is not effective in intubated patients, in extremis, or in overdose conditions. And yes, studies conducted under overdose conditions made the front pages of the world’s most important newspapers.)

Second note: the evidence for ivermectin in Covid is also overwhelming, but I didn’t use it as my example here because I don’t have a contrast as sharp as a study from an Oxford-caliber institution. The Oxford contrast is simply devastating.

I watched all of this unfold in real time, right in front of me. And it led me to an inevitable question: what else was buried before this, throughout the history of medicine?

Chlorine Dioxide

“The Medicine That Could End Medicine;” that’s the subtitle Dr. Pierre Kory and Jenna McCarthy, journalist and co-author, chose for the book. At the very least, it’s intriguing, isn’t it? End it all. Remake everything.

They use that phrase because they believe that chlorine dioxide (ClO₂) poses an existential threat to the business model of the modern pharmaceutical industry, just as hydroxychloroquine threatened Big Pharma’s grip during Covid-19.

Chlorine dioxide is a cheap, non-patentable molecule that people can prepare at home, with reported efficacy against a wide range of infectious and chronic diseases. It could replace or eliminate the need for countless expensive, cartel-controlled medical treatments. Does that unsettle you?

But the book isn’t only about scientific evidence. It tells the story of the molecule itself, and of the people who, throughout history, tried to bring it into wider use. The result? Three suspected murders, including that of Dr. Eugene Blass, who was beaten to death in front of his own laboratory. Another survived multiple poisoning attempts. And there was even a man whose legs were blown off by a bomb planted in his hotel room. Dangerous business, messing with this topic.

Then there are the people who were imprisoned. One case involves a professor and researcher who conducted and published a highly positive study of 500 malaria patients treated with chlorine dioxide in Cameroon, Africa. He traveled to a meeting, and on his way back, someone asked him to carry a package. It contained cocaine. He was arrested for drug trafficking. And the study he had already published? Retracted from the scientific literature. The book reads more like a Hollywood spy thriller than a medical text. It’s a page-turner.

Pierre and Jenna also surface some remarkable details, like the fact that in 1987, NASA called chlorine dioxide a “universal antidote” due to its efficacy against 42 known pathogens.

One of the book’s most brilliant moments is the “Kory Scale.” It’s a satirical but grounded metric he developed to assess the likely efficacy of “unproven” therapies. The premise is simple: the effectiveness of a treatment is directly proportional to the brutality of the attacks it suffers from the medical establishment: the FDA, the media, health agencies. On the scale, media attacks are worth 4 points, imprisonments 10, and murders 50.

The hydroxychloroquine story I told above never reached the level of assassinations. There were intimidating police raids, professionals losing their jobs, others losing their medical licenses, and a staggering volume of media attacks, but on the Kory Scale, that scores relatively few points.

The book has many other striking passages, like the researcher who installed a water treatment system that eradicated malaria in an entire city. Consider the stakes: 600,000 people die of malaria every year.

But one thing needs to be said clearly. For hydroxychloroquine against Covid, we now have the highest possible level of scientific evidence, produced by one of the most important universities in the world. For chlorine dioxide, we don’t have that. But this reminds me of 2020. Early in the pandemic, the first evidence for HCQ in prophylaxis began emerging from observational studies, low on the evidentiary ladder. Yet there were many of them, from many different places, and all positive. Some scientists argued at the time that it was enough, that prophylaxis should begin immediately and the pandemic could be brought to an end. The picture, taken as a whole, was clear. Instead, everyone dragged their feet, held back, buried results in drawers, delayed studies. There was even outright fraud to derail or interrupt ongoing research, with the Surgisphere case being the most glaring example. “Monumental fraud,” said Richard Horton, editor-in-chief of the Lancet.

The book presents striking accounts of a vast range of conditions that reportedly responded to chlorine dioxide: acute infections such as malaria, HIV/AIDS, hepatitis, influenza, and multidrug-resistant tuberculosis; chronic and inflammatory conditions including autism, diabetes, Lyme disease, and hard-to-heal wounds, among them severe cases of gangrene and diabetic foot that avoided imminent amputation.

There are even case series documenting stable remissions in patients with metastatic cancer, pancreatic, prostate, and renal, who had exhausted all conventional options. Dr. Kory acknowledges that formal trials are still needed to determine the precise magnitude of the effect at scale. But the clinical impact of watching diseases labeled “incurable” simply recede is something that both astonishes and challenges the business model of conventional medicine.

Reading the book, I feel the way I did at the start of the pandemic. The evidence for chlorine dioxide, as it stands, shows a great deal. But given the violence of what surrounds this topic, I doubt anyone will ever manage to conduct large, randomized, gold-standard trials on it. One researcher who tried ended up in prison as an international drug trafficker, arrested on his way back from a meeting where he had been seeking funding for another study.

Who This Book Is Not for

If you don’t find the Oxford hydroxychloroquine story important, if it didn’t leave you shaken, this book is not for you.

Think carefully about what happened: with the efficacy Oxford confirmed for prophylaxis, the pandemic could have been over in 2020. One month of lockdowns at most, not a year and a half. Lockdowns that permanently shuttered small businesses, that generated the largest transfer of wealth from the poor to the rich in human history, that destroyed the livelihoods of millions of families, that left lasting illness and psychiatric damage in its wake. If all of that seems reasonable to you, this book is not for you.

[…]

Via https://brownstone.org/articles/buried-before-ivermectin-meet-chlorine-dioxide/

The goal of Zelensky and his lobbyists in the West is to main their own survival even while living in bunkers (Al Mayadeen English, illustrated by Ali al-Hadi Shmeiss

Al Mayadeen English

June 14, 2026

Ukraine has become a testing ground for Western military technologies, AI-driven warfare, and defense industry interests, with the conflict increasingly serving geopolitical and corporate objectives beyond Ukraine itself.

By Mohammad Molaei

The sheer scale of munitions consumed during the Third Imposed War is without modern precedent in American warfare. As reported by The New York Times, within just the first two days of the military aggression that began on February 28, an estimated $5.6 billion worth of precision-guided munitions were expended, a sum that exceeds the annual military budgets of most countries in the world.

Over the full 40-day war leading up to the fragile ceasefire in early April, US forces struck more than 13,000 targets, many of which required multiple munitions each. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the cost of the air campaign alone reached between $11.3 billion in its first six days and $16.5 billion by day twelve.

The total cost over 40 days of full-scale military aggression, followed by subsequent hostilities in the Persian Gulf region, amounts to a far greater sum. While the Pentagon has estimated the figure at around $25 billion, independent assessments place the cost closer to $100 billion.

These figures do not reflect a campaign defined by restraint or resource discipline. Rather, they reveal a military establishment that bet its most advanced precision arsenal on a war it expected to win quickly – only to find itself mired in a quagmire of its own making.

JASSM-ER: Draining the Pacific’s first line of strike

No single weapons system reveals the strategic recklessness of so-called “Operation Epic Fury” more precisely than the AGM-158B Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile Extended Range, known in Pentagon parlance as the JASSM-ER.

This is not a conventional cruise missile. It is a stealthy, air-launched precision strike weapon with a range exceeding 600 miles, purpose-built to penetrate the most sophisticated integrated air defense systems in the world.

Its operational logic is explicitly tied to high-end war scenarios – specifically, a potential confrontation with China in the Western Pacific, where the People’s Liberation Army has constructed the most elaborate anti-access/area-denial architecture in history. The JASSM-ER is the weapon Washington designed for its most serious adversary. And it is largely gone.

At the outset of the war of aggression launched on February 28, the United States held a JASSM-ER inventory of approximately 2,300 missiles. According to Bloomberg, citing a source with direct knowledge of the matter, US forces consumed more than 1,000 JASSM-ERs in the first four weeks of the campaign alone.

The New York Times, drawing on Department of War sources, placed total JASSM-ER expenditure over the full campaign at approximately 1,100 missiles. An additional 47 were fired in a separate operation to abduct Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.

The order to drain Pacific stockpiles for the Iran campaign, stripping missiles from US facilities across the continental US and repositioning them to CENTCOM bases and RAF Fairford in the United Kingdom, was issued at the end of March, according to Bloomberg.

The arithmetic is unambiguous and brutal. Of a prewar JASSM-ER inventory of 2,300, approximately 425 remain available for the rest of the world, roughly 18 percent of the prewar total. In the shorter-range baseline JASSM variant, approximately two-thirds of total stocks across both versions were committed to the Iran campaign, according to Bloomberg.

CSIS calculates that around 25 percent of the total combined JASSM inventory was expended in just 40 days of combat.

The unit cost of the JASSM-ER is $1.1 million per missile. The JASSM baseline variant costs $2.6 million per unit at current procurement figures. The roughly 1,100 JASSM-ERs fired in the recent war, therefore, represent approximately $1.2 billion in precision strike munitions, consumed in a campaign that failed to destroy Iran’s ballistic missile infrastructure, did not fracture its command structure, and did not alter the strategic balance in West Asia.

Replenishment will not be swift, as per experts. The US Air Force has procured JASSM variants at an average rate of nearly 500 per year over the past decade, and existing orders in the pipeline mean that JASSM inventories will recover more quickly than other systems; CSIS estimates “several months to a year” for baseline replacement.

However, this timeline assumes no new wars, no additional campaign consumption, and full US Congressional funding of the FY 2027 military procurement request, which has not yet been appropriated.

Tomahawk: A thousand missiles in the 40-day war

The BGM-109 Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) is the oldest and most combat-proven precision strike weapon in the US Navy’s inventory, having been used in every major American military operation since Operation Desert Storm in 1991.

Its versatility, fired from surface ships and submarines, capable of loitering and retargeting in flight, with a range of approximately 1,000 miles, makes it the Navy’s primary instrument of long-range power projection.

The war against Iran consumed it on a historically unprecedented scale.

The Washington Post reported that US naval assets fired more than 850 Tomahawks in the first month of the third imposed war. The Wall Street Journal subsequently updated that figure to more than 1,000 over the full pre-ceasefire campaign period.

CSIS’s analysis of the first six days alone identified 319 TLAMs expended, representing approximately 10 percent of the prewar inventory in less than a week.

The prewar Tomahawk inventory stood at approximately 3,200 missiles. The expenditure of over 1,000, therefore, represents roughly 31 percent of the prewar total consumed in 40 days, more than ten times the annual procurement rate.

The Pentagon ordered just 190 new Tomahawks in 2026, a figure barely more than half the number fired in the first six days of the war. The US Navy has requested 785 Tomahawks in the FY 2027 budget, a substantial increase from prior years, but CSIS projects these will not begin arriving in US inventories until March 2030, after 34 months of production lead time.

US Tomahawk inventories will not return to prewar levels until late 2030 at the earliest.

The cost consequences compound the strategic ones. Each Tomahawk Block V costs approximately $1.87 million. The 1,000-plus Tomahawks fired in the recent war, therefore, represent approximately $1.9 billion in naval strike capability, consumed against a country that, at the ceasefire, retained its ballistic missile launch capacity, its underground missile production infrastructure, and its ability to control shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

The allied dimension of the Tomahawk shortage adds a further layer of strategic damage. Japan, which recently completed modifications on a destroyer to fire TLAMs and had purchased 400 missiles as part of its historic shift toward a more robust conventional deterrent posture against Chinese pressure, has reportedly been told that its deliveries may be delayed indefinitely because the United States must prioritize refilling its own depleted stockpiles.

Australia has also purchased more than 200 Tomahawks, and the Netherlands has purchased 175. All of these allied orders now sit in a queue behind American replenishment needs, weakening the combined deterrent posture of the US alliance network in the Western Pacific at precisely the moment that network is under the greatest pressure.

The defensive arsenal: Patriot, THAAD, and interceptor crisis

While the consumption of offensive strike missiles has drawn significant analytical attention, the depletion of America’s missile defense interceptor inventory may carry even more severe long-term strategic consequences.

These systems, including the much-hyped Patriot PAC-3 MSE, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and the Standard Missiles SM-3 and SM-6, are not interchangeable with cheaper alternatives. They are the irreplaceable components of layered missile defense architecture, designed to defeat the ballistic and cruise missile threats posed by peer and near-peer adversaries.

In the Pacific scenario, they are the systems that would need to protect US forward bases, carrier strike groups, and allied territory from Chinese ballistic missile salvos in the opening hours of any war. Instead, they are being consumed in the Persian Gulf.

The Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptor, at approximately $4 million per unit, was among the most heavily used anti-missile systems in the recent war imposed on Iran.

The New York Times reported that over 1,200 Patriot interceptors were fired during the aggression. CSIS estimates that Patriot usage, combined with the ongoing supply of interceptors to Ukraine, has left prewar PAC-3 inventory at critically reduced levels.

The Army’s FY 2027 budget requests 3,203 Patriot missiles, a procurement figure that reflects the scale of the shortfall, but CSIS projects these will not begin delivery until May 2029, with full replenishment of prewar levels taking three or more years from the present.

Current Patriot production stands at approximately 650 interceptors per year, with roughly half going to allied orders. Lockheed Martin intends to surge production to 2,000 per year, but achieving this capacity requires years of facility and tooling expansion.

In the interim, the United States faces a set of allocation decisions with no good options: prioritize replenishment of its own depleted stocks, continue supplying Ukraine, or fulfill the orders of the 17 other countries that operate the Patriot system and are now watching their own deliveries pushed back indefinitely.

Swiss authorities have already threatened to cancel their Patriot purchase and seek an alternative supplier after being informed of delivery delays. The bilateral friction this production shortfall is generating with allied governments has been explicitly acknowledged by CSIS and represents a tangible erosion of alliance cohesion at a moment of acute strategic uncertainty.

The THAAD situation is, by CSIS’s assessment, the most critical of all. THAAD is the upper-tier component of the US missile defense architecture, designed to intercept ballistic missiles at higher altitudes and longer ranges than Patriot.

Its interceptors are expensive, scarce, and – as of the ongoing fragile ceasefire – severely depleted. CSIS estimates that between 52 and 81 percent of the prewar THAAD interceptor inventory was expended in the recent war and related offensives, building on roughly 150 THAAD interceptors already consumed during the 12-day war in June 2025.

There have been no new deliveries of THAAD interceptors since August 2023. Deliveries are not scheduled to resume until April 2027 at the earliest. The US Army’s FY 2027 budget requests 857 THAAD interceptors, which CSIS projects will not complete the replacement of the usage during the recent war against Iran until the end of calendar year 2029.

Compounding the interceptor shortage is the damage or possible destruction of multiple AN/TPY-2 radar systems – the targeting backbone of THAAD batteries – during Iranian retaliatory strikes on US facilities in the region.

Only 13 AN/TPY-2 radars have been delivered to the United States in total. The loss or degradation of even two or three of these systems represents a qualitative capability gap that cannot be papered over by procurement requests. The US has also maintained only eight THAAD batteries in total, a number that was considered inadequate for simultaneous deployment in multiple theaters even before the war on Iran consumed the interceptors from those batteries at a rate far exceeding production capacity to replace them.

The ship-launched Standard Missiles present a somewhat less acute but still serious picture. CSIS estimates that SM-3 expenditure in the recent war ranged from 31 to 60 percent of prewar inventory, while SM-6 consumption ran between 16 and 32 percent.

[…]

The cost ledger: What was spent and what was not gained

[…]

The principal expenditures, based on CSIS data and DOD reporting, break down as follows. Over 1,100 JASSM-ER missiles at $1.1 million each account for approximately $1.21 billion. More than 1,000 Tomahawk missiles at $1.87 million each represent approximately $1.87 billion. Over 1,200 Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptors at $4 million each amount to approximately $4.8 billion. More than 1,000 Precision Strike Missiles and ATACMS, at between $500,000 and $1.5 million each, add a further $500 million to $1.5 billion.

[…]

The combined picture across all seven critical munitions categories is that the US will not return to prewar inventory levels for any of its most critical systems before 2028 at the earliest, with Tomahawk, THAAD, and Patriot taking three or more years from the present.

[…]

The production constraint: Why money cannot buy time

[…]

The Trump administration has responded to the munitions crisis with a series of framework agreements with major contractors – Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Boeing – committing to expand production capacity across the full range of critical munitions.

[…]

Manufacturing lead time for advanced missile systems – the period between contract award and first delivery – runs between 34 and 39 months for the most critical systems. Building new production facilities, qualifying new supply chains, training additional skilled labor, and resolving bottlenecks in specialized components such as guidance systems and rocket motors are processes measured in years, not quarters.

[…]

Via https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2026/06/13/770362/strategic-arsenal-us-lost-war-against-iran-why-replenishment-will-take-years