The Cradle

The White House is having difficulty launching its so-called Gaza International Stabilization Force (ISF), as countries that previously expressed willingness to deploy troops to the project now seek to distance themselves from it, according to a 29 November report in the Washington Post.

The ISF “is struggling to get off the ground as countries considered likely to contribute soldiers have grown wary” over concerns their soldiers may be required to use force against Palestinians.

Indonesia had stated it would send 20,000 peacekeeping troops. However, officials in Jakarta speaking with the US news outlet said they now plan to provide a much smaller contingent of about 1,200.

Azerbaijan has also reneged on a previous commitment to provide troops. Baku will only send troops if there is a complete halt to fighting, Reuters reported earlier this month.

US President Donald Trump’s plan for Gaza envisioned meaningful troop contributions from Arab states, including the UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar. But after expressing early interest, none have committed to participating.

“A month ago, things were in a better place,” one regional official with knowledge of the issue stated.

Trump’s plan for post-war Gaza rests on the ability of an international force to occupy the strip and was endorsed by a UN Security Council resolution on 17 November.

However, because the resolution gave the force the mandate to “demilitarize” the Gaza Strip, many countries are resisting participation.

They say their troops could be required to disarm Hamas on Israel’s behalf. This would require killing Palestinians and possibly cast their forces as co-perpetrators in Israel’s genocide in front of the world.

Some officers are “really hesitant” to participate, one Indonesian official said.

“They want the international stabilizing force to come into Gaza and restore, quote unquote, law and order and disarm any resistance,” a senior official in Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said. “So that’s the problem. Nobody wants to do that.”

Participation would also put their soldiers in harm’s way, whether from Hamas or the ongoing Israeli airstrikes, which regularly kill Palestinians despite the alleged ceasefire that took effect in October.

Sources familiar with the plan told the Washington Post that the White House plans to man the force with between 15,000 and 20,000 foreign troops, divided into three brigades to be deployed in early 2026.

However, details have not been finalized, which has led to additional hesitancy among potential participating nations.

“Commitments are being considered. No one is going to send troops from their country without understanding the specifics of the mission,” the official said.

Efforts to establish the so-called “Board of Peace,” a committee of Palestinian technocrats taking orders directly from the White House to deal with the day-to-day administration of the enclave, have also stalled.

“We thought, with the Security Council resolution, within 48 to 72 hours, the Board of Peace would be announced,” another person familiar with the plan told The Post. “But nothing, not even informally.”

No other members of the Board of Peace have yet been named.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has stated that the Israeli army will disarm Hamas if foreign countries are unwilling to do so for them.

“All indicators show that indeed no countries are willing to take on this responsibility, and that understanding is sinking in both in Israel and in the US,” said Ofer Guterman, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in Tel Aviv.

“Bottom line: It’s unlikely that the ISF, if it’s established at all, will lead to Gaza’s demilitarization,” he added.

Tamara Kharroub, Deputy Executive Director and Senior Fellow of the Arab Center in Washington, DC, described the Trump plan as “Permanent Palestinian subjugation and neocolonial rule dressed up as peace.”

“There are no guarantees or binding mechanisms or clarity around what constitutes reform or demilitarization and around who determines what they are. The plan ultimately gives Israel a blank check to prolong its presence in Gaza, fully reoccupy it, or resume its genocidal war,” Kharroub wrote.

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Via https://thecradle.co/articles/gaza-stabilization-force-fails-to-launch-as-nation-unwilling-to-commit-troops-report

The Cradle

In the wake of Israel’s November 2024 apparent “ceasefire” with Lebanon, Tel Aviv has moved to reshape the post-war order in its favor. Treating Lebanon as a weakened and fragmented state, Israel seeks to impose a long-term, unilateral security and economic regime in the south, bolstered by US backing.

Simultaneously, Saudi Arabia has thrust itself into the reconstruction process as the main Arab financier. But the kingdom risks becoming a junior partner in an Israeli-American project that sidelines it from real decision-making. The question facing Riyadh is clear: Will it bankroll its own marginalization?

Tel Aviv’s vision: Disarmament, deterrence, domination

Israel’s strategy for Lebanon extends far beyond the oft-repeated demand to disarm Hezbollah. It envisions a sweeping transformation of Lebanon into a demilitarized satellite state governed under a US-Israeli security framework. Nowhere is this clearer than in Tel Aviv’s insistence on remaining inside Lebanese territory until Hezbollah is stripped of its deterrent capabilities, not just south of the Litani River, but across the country.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz and former Northern Command chief Uri Gordin have both publicly outlined this goal. Gordin even suggested establishing a permanent buffer zone inside Lebanon to serve as a “bargaining chip” for future negotiations, while Katz confirmed that Israeli forces would remain indefinitely in the south. Tel Aviv no longer seeks temporary deterrence, favoring permanent subordination.

Katz, for his part, has stated “Hezbollah is playing with fire,” and called on Beirut to “fulfill its obligations to disarm the party and remove it from southern Lebanon.”

Most recently, while addressing the Knesset, he warned that “We will not allow any threats against the inhabitants of the north, and maximum enforcement will continue and even intensify.”

“If Hezbollah does not give up its weapons by the year’s end, we will work forcefully again in Lebanon,” Katz reiterated. “We will disarm them.”

According to this blueprint, Lebanon is not considered a sovereign neighbor, but a security appendage to Israel’s northern frontier. State institutions are expected to serve as administrative fronts for a de facto Israeli-American command center. International aid, including funding from Arab states of the Persian Gulf, is being weaponized to enforce this new security-economic order.

From the perspective of Israel, the goals in Lebanon are not limited to the disarmament of Hezbollah. They go beyond that toward a deeper project of transforming Lebanon – especially the south – into a kind of security-economic colony.

This includes consolidating a long-term military presence, imposing new border arrangements, and paving the way for settlement projects or institutionalized buffer zones, as evidenced by current maps showing the presence of Israeli forces at several points inside Lebanese territory.

Saudi Arabia’s options: Pressure or partnership

Enter Riyadh. The Saudi Foreign Ministry has repeatedly called for Lebanese arms to be confined to the state and endorsed the implementation of the 1989 Taif Agreement.

In September,  Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan, in a speech to the UN General Assembly, stressed that:

“Saudi Arabia stands with Lebanon, supports everything that strengthens its security and stability, and welcomes the efforts of the Lebanese state to implement the Taif Agreement (1989), affirm its sovereignty, and place weapons in the hands of the state and its legitimate institutions.”

The Saudi envoy to Lebanon, Yazid bin Farhan, reiterated Riyadh’s position: the exclusive right to possess arms must lie with the Lebanese state. In private information, during a meeting between Bin Farhan and Sunni leaders in Lebanon, the diplomat stressed that pressure must be put on disarming the party, even if that requires reaching a civil war.

On the surface, Saudi and Israeli objectives appear aligned. Tel Aviv applies military pressure. Riyadh applies economic and political pressure. Both demand the end of Hezbollah’s armed presence. But while Israel’s aim is absolute control over Lebanon’s security order, Saudi Arabia still seeks a political system that reflects its influence. In this, Tel Aviv’s ambitions collide with Riyadh’s.

However, Israel has no intention of sharing influence with any Arab state – nor even Turkiye. Its model is exclusionary. It views Riyadh not as a partner, but as a bankrolling mechanism to finance the dismantling of Lebanon’s axis of resistance under Israeli terms. As former deputy director of the National Security Council, Eran Lerman put it, Saudi Arabia is merely a pressure tool to bring Lebanon to heel.

Thus, the crux of the matter is this: Riyadh may envision itself as a key stakeholder in post-war Lebanon, but Israel sees it as a disposable auxiliary.

The 17 May redux: Recolonizing south Lebanon

To grasp the depth of Israel’s project, one need only look to its precedents. In 1983, Israel, alongside the US and under Syrian oversight, tried to enshrine a similar model via the 17 May Agreement. That deal called for an end to hostilities, gradual Israeli withdrawal, a “security zone” in the south, and joint military arrangements. In practice, it turned Lebanon into a protectorate tasked with safeguarding Israeli security interests.

Today, after the 2024 war, Tel Aviv is resurrecting that same formula. Israeli forces have remained stationed at multiple points inside Lebanon despite the ceasefire terms mandating full withdrawal. Airspace violations and near-daily raids persist under the pretext of preventing Hezbollah from “repositioning.” Think tanks in Tel Aviv, alongside joint French-US proposals, are now pushing phased disarmament: first the south, then the Bekaa, then the Syrian border, ultimately ending all resistance capabilities.

International support is being dangled as a carrot. Aid from the US, France, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and others is contingent on Lebanon executing a disarmament plan under International Monetary Fund (IMF) oversight and within a strict timeline. This is the economic arm of the Israeli security project.

More dangerously, Israeli studies suggest that reconstruction of southern villages should be explicitly tied to the removal of resistance forces, while preserving “full freedom of action” for the Israeli army in Lebanese air and land space.

Can Riyadh afford Tel Aviv’s trap?

In parallel with this vision, western analyses close to decision-making circles in Washington and Riyadh show that Saudi Arabia itself sees Lebanon as a pivotal arena in its conflict with Iran. Any serious return to the Lebanese file is linked to the weakening of Hezbollah’s influence.

But the key divergence between the Saudi and Israeli approaches lies in a critical question: Who ultimately holds the keys to decision-making in Lebanon?

Riyadh aims to use its financial and political capital to recalibrate the Lebanese political order in its favor, minimizing Iranian sway while reinforcing its own influence. But Israel’s plan is more radical: to redefine Lebanese sovereignty altogether, placing it under perpetual Israeli security oversight.

In this model, Saudi Arabia – and any other Arab state – is reduced to the role of financier, tasked with implementing terms written in Tel Aviv and Washington rather than contributing an independent Arab vision for the region.

From this angle, Tel Aviv’s persistent invocation of the “military option” in Lebanon works against Gulf interests. It positions Riyadh and its allies as the paymasters for reconstruction, forced to foot the bill for a post-war settlement they had no role in shaping.

If Saudi Arabia concedes to this logic – and fails to leverage its influence in Washington, in Arab diplomatic circles, and in donor mechanisms – it risks forfeiting Lebanon to a joint Israeli-American order.

That order would mirror the defunct 17 May Agreement, only more deeply entrenched. Lebanon would not only be demilitarized. It would become a living model of “security-economic conjugation,” designed to recalibrate regional influence away from the Arab world and toward an Israeli-dominated Levant.

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Via https://thecradle.co/articles/will-saudi-arabia-fund-israels-grip-over-lebanon