China’s call for Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon and its proposal for a multilateral peace initiative signal more than a diplomatic intervention. They reflect Beijing’s gradual emergence as a geopolitical actor seeking to shape conflict management in a context of declining hegemonic coordination and increasing fragmentation of the international order.
At the normative level, China’s emphasis on sovereignty and territorial integrity is consistent with its long-standing foreign policy doctrine. By framing the situation as a violation of Lebanon’s sovereignty, Beijing aligns itself with principles embedded in the United Nations system while simultaneously appealing to a broader Global South audience that remains sensitive to issues of external intervention and colonialism.
This normative posture, however, is not neutral: it allows China to occupy a position of selective legitimacy, selectively aligning itself with principles such as sovereignty and restraint while contrasting its discourse with what is increasingly perceived as the erosion of the Western-led liberal order. This dynamic reflects broader processes of legitimacy contestation in international society, whereby emerging powers reinterpret and selectively appropriate norms to enhance their own standing (Ian Clark 2005: Legitimacy in International Society; Amitav Acharya 2014: The End of American World Order).
From a theoretical standpoint, this move can be interpreted through the lens of hegemonic transition. As Robert Gilpin argues in War and Change in World Politics, the relative decline of a dominant power creates opportunities for other actors to reshape the international order, often leading to periods of instability and systemic reconfiguration.
In this context, as the capacity of the United States to impose or coordinate regional stability becomes more contested, emerging powers such as China are not merely balancing militarily but increasingly positioning themselves as alternative providers of diplomatic and institutional frameworks, or simply as alternative providers of order.
Chinese New Way and Its Limits
Importantly, Beijing’s approach differs from traditional interventionism. Rather than projecting force, China is advancing what can be termed a procedural strategy of influence: shaping agendas, convening actors, and embedding itself within multilateral frameworks. Keohane in After Hegemony shows how influence is exercised not only through coercion but through institutions, rules, and agenda-setting, which structure how actors behave.
This reflects a broader pattern in Chinese foreign policy, where legitimacy is constructed through process rather than coercion, even if underlying strategic interests remain clear. In this sense, it signals not a replacement of hegemony, but a reconfiguration of how influence is exercised.
This dynamic is further illustrated by recent diplomatic activity involving key intermediary states in the region—including Egypt, Oman, Türkiye, and Pakistan—seeking to reach an end in the US–Israel–Iran war. Preliminary consultations took place in Islamabad, pointing to the emergence of alternative diplomatic channels beyond traditional Western-led frameworks. Following the initial round of talks, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Ishaq Dar, travelled to Beijing for consultations with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, with discussions focusing on coordinating positions and outlining negotiating points. This episode shows China’s growing role as a convening power and an emerging broker of order in a fragmented, post-hegemonic international system.
Yet, the limits of this approach are equally evident. Without enforcement capacity on the ground, China’s influence depends on the willingness of regional actors to engage and on the degree to which its initiatives are perceived as credible alternatives. The absence of an official response from Israel evidences this constraint, highlighting the persistent gap between discursive power—understood as the ability to shape narratives and norms (Foucault 1977: Power/Knowledge)—and operational leverage, which rests on material and coercive capabilities (Strange 1988: States and Markets).
What is being revealed, therefore, is not simply a reaction to a regional crisis but a subtle reconfiguration of diplomatic hierarchies. China is not replacing existing powers; it is testing the boundaries of a post-hegemonic order, where multiple actors seek to define the terms of conflict management. Whether this translates into concrete outcomes will depend less on the strength of Beijing’s statements and more on its ability to convert diplomatic initiative into sustained political engagement.
Chinese Intelligence or Intelligence Diplomacy?
This diplomatic positioning cannot be fully understood without considering the less visible, but increasingly central, role of Chinese intelligence. Long perceived by Western security services as primarily inward-looking, China’s intelligence apparatus has, over the past decade, evolved into a transnational system operating at the intersection of national security, economic strategy, and political influence. Anchored in the strategic objective of the “great rejuvenation” of the Chinese nation, this system does not separate domestic stability from external projection. Rather, it integrates the acquisition of technological capabilities, and the shaping of foreign political environments into a single, coherent framework of state power.
What distinguishes this model is not merely its scope, but its method. Unlike the more centralised and operationally visible approaches associated with agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency or Mossad, Chinese intelligence relies on a diffuse, networked logic often described as a “whole-of-society” approach. Information is accumulated incrementally—through academic exchanges, business networks, cyber operations, and long-term relationship-building—rather than through singular, high-profile operations. At the institutional core of this system stands the Ministry of State Security, complemented by party structures such as the United Front Work Department, which extend influence across transnational social and political spaces.
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The Most Revolutionary Act 