Bloomberg reports that generation at Ukrainian nuclear facilities was cut back by 40-90%, with only 2 out of 9 total reactors operating at full power:

Keep in mind, Ukraine only has 3 nuclear plants remaining under its control, it’s just that each of those has multiple reactors, thus the 9 total counted. As you can see, Rivne with 4, Khmelnytskiy with 2, and Yuzhnoukrainsk with 3 reactors:

It was said that the major energy terminal in Mukachevo, far western Ukraine, was hit, which couples and transmits European energy to Ukraine. Needless to say, if the hit was effective, it could in large part cut Ukraine off from emergency power transmission from Europe:

Ukrainian intelligence claims that Russia has stockpiled enough missiles for several of such large strikes in a row.

Protocol would have it that more systematic strikes like this would follow, weekly or so, for the winter campaign. Russian ISR would spend some time doing damage assessments then continue levying strikes on the areas which need further degrading.

Now, as if timed to stave off the morale depletion of the coming ‘dark winter’, Biden is reportedly set to announce the removal of long-range strikes restrictions on Ukraine’s ATACMS.

This announcement was reportedly immediately followed by France and Britain authorizing use of Storm Shadow/Scalp missiles on Russian territory as well. As we’ve discussed here many times, politically neutered and ideologically paralyzed Europe can do nothing without its master first giving the go ahead or signaling support.

 

In the NYT article above, they seem to imply the strikes could be limited to just a narrow band of Kursk, where the purported “North Korean troops” may be active.

The weapons are likely to be initially employed against Russian and North Korean troops in defense of Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region of western Russia, the officials said.

There’s a lot of things to say about this development.

Firstly: ATACMS have already disappeared from the battlefield, the last usage being recorded something like months ago.

Second: HIMARS have already been used all over Kursk, including on a Russian column some months ago. Both regular HIMARS missiles and ATACMS are fired from the same truck—so this new ‘authorization’ strikes as a little strange. Though the NYT article addresses this:

To help the Ukrainians defend Kharkiv, Mr. Biden allowed them to use the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS, which have a range of about 50 miles, against Russian forces directly across the border. But Mr. Biden did not allow the Ukrainians to use longer-range ATACMS, which have a range of about 190 miles, in defense of Kharkiv.

The difference is that Ukraine can target HIMARS with their own tactical-depth drone interfaces, whereas to launch ATACMS at an operational-strategic depth would require higher level involvement, and potentially NATO satellite ISR, etc. However, that only makes a difference if ATACMS is actually allowed to be fired into the operational depth, whereas certain “hints” continue to indicate it may be a more limited geographical window—which would make this ‘authorization’ no different than previous HIMARS use.

Third: HIMARS, M270s and German Mars II variants have all been greatly attrited during the Kursk excursion of the past three months to the point that it’s questionable how many units Ukraine even has remaining. It may be a few but not enough to conduct big simultaneous volleys of ATACMS, which—unlike regular HIMARS missiles—can only be fired one at a time per truck.

The announcement comes just as ATACMS stocks have been depleted, with several articles over the past month or so noting this. The same goes for Storm Shadow/Scalp:

From The Sunday Times:

Defence sources have suggested that Labour’s reluctance to do so is likely to stem from the fact that UK stockpiles have reached a level below which military chiefs are not prepared to go, because a certain number must be kept in reserve to protect the UK’s own interests.

It begs the question, is this more smoke and mirrors meant to bolster Ukrainian morale without actually angering Russia too much?

The natural interpretation, of course, is that Biden seeks to wreck Trump’s chances of ending the war by a last minute escalation and provocation in one which could put Russia on a vengeful track that would dash any post-inauguration peace talks. It really all depends on what the secret fine print and limitations on the strikes will be—for instance, as stated, only in the narrow circle around the Kursk fighting, rather than attacks to the true operational or strategic depth.

But the NYT article reveals the other real reason for the desperate escalatory behavior:

The Ukrainians hope that they would be able to trade any Russian territory they hold in Kursk for Ukrainian territory held by Russia in any future negotiations.

If the Russian assault on Ukrainian forces in Kursk succeeds, Kyiv could end up having little to no Russian territory to offer Moscow in a trade.

Officials said Mr. Biden was persuaded to make the change in part by the sheer audacity of Russia’s decision to throw North Korean troops at Ukrainian lines.

He was also swayed, they said, by concerns that the Russian assault force would be able to overwhelm Ukrainian troops in Kursk if they were not allowed to defend themselves with long-range weapons.

So, Biden was “swayed” by the possibility that Russia could kick Ukraine out of Kursk. Remember when the US pretended to not be on board with the Kursk operation at all? Now suddenly they too realize it’s Ukraine’s only remaining chance at some semblance of a negotiating position.

And that’s really all that matters, as they openly admit the ATACMS won’t actually do anything to change the war itself.

Interview from September is a reminder of what Putin had to say about the long-range strike escalation.

He confirms what I said earlier: that Ukraine is already capable of doing moderate tactical level ISR over Russia’s borders with its own small drones; but long-range strikes deep into Russian territory is a whole other story. Putin ends up saying appropriate decisions will be made if Russia deems the US and NATO as being officially at war with Russia, which will be the case if this long-range strike decision actually stands.

Many people believe that Russia would not asymmetrically respond by, for instance, arming the Houthis because Russia has shown official support to the Aden government at the UN level.

But the situation is not so clear cut. Western intel agencies report Russia has already been supplying targeting data to Houthis, though of course this could be psyop information.

[…]

One interesting clip that has gone viral this week amongst the networks featured undersecretary of defense William Laplante admitting he was blown away by the Houthi’s sudden and miraculous advancement of missile technology, which seemingly came out of no where—where do you think it might have come from so out of the blue?

[…]

Recall a couple reports ago I had put forth a theory from another analyst that Trump could cleverly stage an attempt to end the war, but then blame Zelensky for being hard-headed and “wash his hands” of it all, dumping the conflict on Europe.

Now for the first time, a major MSM outlet has lent credence to this. The latest FT article outright states that Trump may blame his failures on Zelensky’s intransigence and walk away.

This would solve the great conundrum of: how does Trump prevent a total Ukrainian loss becoming his ‘Afghanistan withdrawal’ fiasco? By dumping all blame on an unmovable Zelensky, Trump could say ‘he tried’—perhaps then levying the remainder of the blame on Biden’s administration.

The last selection is interesting for the overlapping new theme it represents. Two articles, from Politico and New York Times, both unexpectedly propose that Trump’s election win is probably actually a good thing for Ukraine.

[…]

The NYT piece is remarkable in its admissions. It says that Trump forcing Ukraine to give up land would look like a major defeat of the West, but no matter—the author writes it is necessary because Ukraine is being devastated and Putin has no reason to stop; finally reality dawns on them!

Despite flashes of spectacular success by Ukrainian forces, the Russian position has gradually strengthened, and there is no reason to expect Mr. Putin to lose the upper hand now. That may sound like defeatism, but it’s also realism.

The even bigger admission is the now naked truth that the war is in fact a proxy war, spurred on by NATO and the West.

[…]

The new strikes authorization is presumably meant to tide Ukrainian societal morale over for a few months, with perhaps some kind of flashy ‘hit’ somewhere, that will be oversold as “devastating” to Russia, but it’s questionable how much mileage they can get even out of that anymore.

Remember: for the Storm Shadows to be fired “deep” into Russian territory, the F-16s—or whatever platform carrying them—would have to get almost right up to the Russian border, and risk almost certain shoot down by Russian patrol craft, long range AD, etc. The same goes for ATACMS—everyone just assumes it can hit max distance into Voronezh, but to do that the ATACMS would have to be right on the border. They learned the hard way what happens when they try that, as a slew of HIMARS trucks were destroyed not far from the border in the Kursk fiasco.

With stockpiles for both ATACMS, Storm Shadows, and even future-potential Taurus missiles scraping the bottom of the barrel, it’s not expected they could make any real mark.

[…]

Via https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/operation-dark-winter-resumes-as